Samir Moussa v. PA Dept Pub Welfare by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-21-2011 
Samir Moussa v. PA Dept Pub Welfare 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"Samir Moussa v. PA Dept Pub Welfare" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1936. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1936 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






SAMIR M. MOUSSA,  




PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE;  
STACY GEYER, an agent and employee of the  
PA Department of Public Welfare 
____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-00009) 
District Judge:  Honorable Sean J. McLaughlin 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: SCIRICA, BARRY and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 






BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Samir Moussa was terminated as a staff physician at the Polk Center, a medical 
facility operated by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (“DPW”), after an 
 2 
investigation revealed his repeated sexual harassment of female co-workers.  Moussa 
brought suit in the District Court, alleging that his termination resulted from 
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex, and that it was in retaliation 
for an earlier lawsuit.  The Court granted Defendants’ summary judgment motions in a 
thorough opinion.  We will affirm for substantially the reasons articulated by the Court. 
I.   Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, viewing the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion.  Pa. Coal Ass’n v. Babbitt, 63 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 1995).  A 
district court’s grant of summary judgment is proper only if “the movant shows that there 
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
II.  Background 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we recite only those facts essential to 
our disposition of this appeal.  Moussa, who is of Egyptian origin, began employment at 
the Polk Center on February 10, 1986.  In 1999, his employment was terminated based on 
allegations that he had been suturing patients without anesthesia.  After the charges were 
dismissed and he was reinstated, he brought a lawsuit alleging race and national-origin 
discrimination and received a settlement following a favorable jury verdict.  
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Years later, on August 4, 2005, a physical therapist named Colleen Dahl filed an 
Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination Complaint alleging that Moussa had tried 
to kiss her both (1) earlier that day, and (2) shortly before Memorial Day.  The complaint 
sparked an investigation, during the pendency of which Moussa was suspended without 
pay.  In sending a letter confirming Moussa’s suspension, Michael Hanwell, a 
Supervisory Analyst with the Bureau of Human Resources, Labor Relations, suggested to  
his supervisor that he “may recall Dr. Moussa” from the earlier lawsuit.  (App. 281.) 
The investigation revealed two other female co-workers who claimed that Moussa 
had sexually harassed them:  Ellen Leakes alleged that Moussa had once “slammed her 
against the wall” and “had his tongue down her throat while he attempted to remove her 
clothing,” and that the encounter left her bruised (id. 212), and Julianna Lewis alleged 
that Moussa had once “grabbed [her] and kissed [her] on [the] lips.”  (Id. 252.)  Moussa 
consistently denied these allegations, suggesting that they were motivated by greed or 
jealousy. 
During the investigation, on November 5, 2005, Defendant Stacey Geyer was hired 
as the director of the Polk Center.  On December 20, 2005, a conference call was held 
among Geyer; Hanwell; and Nancy Murray, Geyer’s direct supervisor, during which the 
investigation was discussed.  The following day, Hanwell wrote to Geyer, stating that 
Polk would need to submit a “request to remove” to effectuate Moussa’s termination, and 
Geyer confirmed that it would be done.  On December 23, 2005, DPW issued a Request 
 4 
to Effect Action, concluding that “the three employees are credible and that the conduct 
described by them actually occurred.”  (Id. 232.) 
On December 29, 2005, Moussa was informed that he was terminated effective 
January 4, 2006.  The termination letter was signed by Geyer, who testified at her 
deposition that she had no direct involvement with the investigation and was unfamiliar 
with the accusations against Moussa but signed the letter because she was instructed to do 
so by Murray. 
Moussa filed suit on January 19, 2007.  The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on March 31, 2010, and Moussa timely appealed. 
III.  Discussion 
 Moussa’s primary contention on appeal is that the District Court erred in 
dismissing his claims of race and national origin discrimination.  Specifically, he argues 
that the different discipline that two other employees received for workplace misconduct 




In the absence of direct evidence, claims of discrimination under Title VII and 
Section 1983 are analyzed pursuant to a familiar burden-shifting framework.
2
  See 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Stewart v. Rutgers, 120 F.3d 
                                                 
1
 Moussa abandoned his claim of sex discrimination at oral argument before the District 
Court. 
2
 Although Moussa had also brought claims of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
Moussa does not appeal the District Court’s conclusion that there is no private right of 
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426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Our application of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework 
is applicable to Stewart’s allegation of racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § . . . 1983.” 
(footnote omitted)).  Under that framework, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima 
facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to produce a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.  The plaintiff must then respond by showing that 
the defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual. To prove that an explanation is 
pretextual, a plaintiff must “cast sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons 
proffered by the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that each reason 
was a fabrication or allow the factfinder to infer that discrimination was more likely than 
not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.”  Wishkin v. 
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007) (alterations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).    
In this case, the District Court presumed that Moussa had established a prima facie 
case of discrimination but held both that (1) Defendants had articulated a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for his termination (namely, his repeated sexual harassment of 
his co-workers), and (2) he had failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to whether this 
reason was pretextual.  
In an attempt to show pretext, Moussa had pointed to two white males who were 
disciplined less harshly after also receiving complaints of workplace misconduct.  See 
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing that a plaintiff may show 
                                                                                                                                                             
action against a state actor under that statute. 
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pretext by demonstrating “that the employer treated other, similarly situated persons not 
of his protected class more favorably”).  The District Court, however, ruled that neither 
comparator was similarly situated.  We agree. 
The first comparator identified by Moussa, Michael Winger, was accused of 
discussing his sexual experiences in the office and once placing his hands on a female co-
worker’s hips and pulling her towards him.  After an investigation that included eleven 
witness interviews, DPW concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated, and the 
complaint was dismissed. The second comparator, Curt Anderson, was found to have 
been engaged in a consensual sexual relationship with a subordinate employee.  Although 
he was suspended during the investigation, his suspension was limited to thirty days after 
he brought a union grievance.  He was ultimately demoted but not terminated. 
The District Court correctly concluded that neither comparator was “similarly 
situated,” such that the difference in the discipline that they received could support a 
jury’s finding of pretext.  As it observed, the allegations against Winger were 
substantially less serious than the allegations against Moussa, and a thorough 
investigation concluded that they were unfounded.  And while Anderson’s relationship 
with a subordinate may have been improper, there is no suggestion that it was 
involuntary, and certainly no suggestion that it involved the application of physical force.  
Insofar as DPW’s investigation concluded that Moussa had repeatedly approached 
women and forcibly attempted to kiss them against their will, the Court correctly held that 
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the comparators were insufficiently similar to permit a jury to conclude that Defendants’ 
proffered reason for terminating him was pretextual.
3
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
                                                 
3
 Moussa raises two other arguments on appeal, neither meritorious.  First, he suggests 
that Geyer’s “mendacity” at her deposition would allow a fact finder to conclude that she 
acted out of retaliatory intent.  In our judgment, a jury could only interpret Geyer’s 
deposition transcript as evidence of retaliatory intent by engaging in rank speculation; 
Geyer was hired late in the investigation that led to Moussa’s termination, and it is 
unsurprising that she recalls few of its details.  Second, Moussa argues that Geyer is liable 
under Section 1983 as the “cat’s paw” because, even if she did not have discriminatory 
intent, she was the vehicle through which the discriminatory intent of others was realized.  
Insofar as Moussa has failed to proffer evidence from which a fact finder could conclude 
that anyone at DPW acted with discriminatory or retaliatory intent, we need not consider 
whether the cat’s paw theory is cognizable under Section 1983. 
